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Abstract— The aim of this paper was to determine the 
feasibility of identifying a device connected to the Internet 
through multiple interfaces (i.e., multi-homed) using the 
information provided by passively observing network traffic. 
Since multi-homed hosts allow an alternate means for outside 
entities to circumvent the security of a firewall and gain access to 
a network, it is important for a network’s security to be able to 
detect and remove such devices. In this work, the idea of using 
clock skew—the difference in perceived time between two system 
clocks—as a unique signature is utilized to identify hosts on a 
network that are potentially multi-homed. Testing was done on a 
software-defined network that contained a multi-homed host. 
After traffic between hosts was collected and processed, analysis 
of the confidence intervals of the device’s clock skew was 
conducted to determine if IP addresses originating from the same 
host could be successfully detected solely from network traffic. 
Results confirmed that the proposed scheme provided a valid 
means of detecting a multi-homed device on a network.  
Keywords— Software-defined network, Multi-homed host, 
Network monitoring, Network fingerprinting  
I. INTRODUCTION  
Network security remains a major concern for all 
communications systems. With the advent of network 
management techniques such as software-defined networking 
(SDN), the ability of a system administrator to leverage the 
monitoring functions of a panoptic controller have led to the 
development of a large range of applications for network 
control and security to include monitoring applications for 
maintaining the security and integrity of one’s network [1]. 
A variety of security and cyber related concerns exist for 
any network. Before an attack can be conducted on a network, 
an attacker must first gain access. One method to prevent this 
is the use of a firewall between a private network and the 
Internet. A potential security flaw in a network is the existence 
of a multi-homed host [2]-[4]. Through the use of multiple 
interfaces on a host, the security of a network and the integrity 
of its firewall can be circumvented. 
A multi-homed host is a device connected to the Internet 
through multiple interfaces [2]-[4]. If one of these connections 
is to a private network and the other to the open Internet, this 
provides a possible access vector that bypasses the network’s 
firewall [4]. This threat calls for the need to be able to detect if 
a multi-homed host exists on a network and is the motivation 
behind this research. 
The goal of this paper is to develop a scheme for detecting 
multi-homed hosts in a panoptic network such as a SDN. A 
framework for an application that can be used to detect hosts 
using multiple interfaces that are independent of their Internet 
Protocol (IP) or Media Access Control (MAC) address is 
provided in this paper. We investigate the use of the clock 
skew of a host compared to a designated fingerprinter as a 
unique identifier. If a unique clock skew correlates to two or 
more unique IP addresses on the network, this represents a 
possible multi-homed device. Analyses are conducted based on 
the confidence intervals of the calculated clock skews to 
determine if two similar clock skews represent the same, multi-
homed host. 
The idea for using the clock skew of a host for remote 
physical device fingerprinting was first suggested in [5]. It was 
shown that modern computer chips had detectable and 
distinguishable clock skews that could be calculated by 
observing the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 
timestamps from traffic on the network. It was then verified 
that the clock skew of a device remained constant even when 
using separate Ethernet and Wi-Fi interfaces originating from 
the same device [6]. This idea was further used as an 
enumeration tool in [7]. Researchers used clock skews of a 
device to determine the number of hosts active behind a 
network address terminal (NAT). This was accomplished by 
counting the number of unique clocks skews encountered from 
traffic exiting a NAT and correlating them to unique devices 
[7]. 
In this paper, these ideas are expanded upon and are used to 
detect multi-homed devices active on a SDN. We also conduct 
the confidence interval analysis of the clock skew data 
encountered on the network to identify devices that appear to 
be separate based on IP address but are originating from the 
same device. This paper is adapted from [8], previously 
published by the Naval Postgraduate School. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Network security continues to be a vital concern for a 
constantly connected society. One such concern is the access 
afforded to a network via a multi-homed host [2]. Mitigating 
the threat on a SDN by detecting such a device is the focus of 
this research. Before proposing the detection scheme for such a 
device, the relevant background information is presented in this 
section to introduce the threats and tools that are used to 
mitigate them.  
A. Multi-Homed Host 
A multi-homed host is one that has multiple connections to 
a network or networks. This can be accomplished by having 
U.S. Government work not protected by U.S. copyright
multiple network interface cards (NICs) installed in the same 
host, which provides a host with multiple MAC and IP 
addresses [3]. Multi-homed hosts are used in a network for 
redundancy purposes [2]. With a multi-homed host on a 
network, the reliability of a network’s access can be increased. 
Access node failure can be mitigated, and the connectivity 
from an Internet service provider (ISP) can be made more 
reliable by having separate connections to separate ISPs [9]. 
The threat from a multi-homed host comes from the fact 
that a multi-homed host can be used to bypass the firewall 
between an internal network and the Internet [2]. Certain 
operating systems, such as Windows, were never meant to 
isolate two interfaces within a host and often integrate traffic 
from one to the other [2]. This results in the ability for an 
infection on one network to be passed to another.  
Closed networks are protected from the Internet by 
firewalls, which only allow designated traffic to flow between 
the two mediums. If a host is multi-homed, this allows for the 
opportunity to bypass the firewall and provide access to a 
closed network [4]. Once access to a host on a closed network 
is gained, potential threats can map a network and begin an 
exploitation process or infect the network with malicious code. 
An example of such a network configuration is depicted in 
Figure 1.  
 
 
Fig. 1. A Network with a Multi-Homed Host Implemented to Bypass the 
Firewall to the Internet 
A software-defined network is an innovative networking 
scheme in which the control and data planes within a network 
are logically separated. In a SDN, the routing functions for the 
network are controlled from a centralized location, known as 
the controller [1], [10], [11]. This centralized controller is able 
to view the operation of the entire network, allowing it to 
monitor and react to any potential hazards that may exist [11]. 
A SDN is divided into three planes that each interact to 
control the functionality of the network. The lowest plane is the 
data plane, which consists of switches that forward packets 
based on flow rules [1]. Above the data plane is the control 
plane. From here, network traffic is monitored, and the flow 
rules for designated packets are determined [1], [10], [12]. The 
controller can be programmed by applications, allowing the 
network to dynamically react to any changes within the 
network. This is done at the upper plane, known as the 
application plane of the network [1], [12].  
Routing within a SDN is completed using flow rules that 
are determined at the control plane and stored at the data plane. 
Due to this functionality, routing is now a rule-based process 
vice a destination-based process [1]. A SDN operates as a 
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) 
network and uses the OpenFlow protocol for its rule-based 
routing. The OpenFlow protocol matches packets to designated 
flow rules within a flow table at the data plane. If no such rule 
exists, the packet is forwarded to the control plane where a 
decision is made as to how it should be routed. Once this 
determination is made, the packet is forwarded back to the data 
plane for routing along with updates for the flow tables for 
future routing decisions [11], [12]. 
B. System Clocks 
Networked devices all have internal electric clocks that are 
built from both hardware and software components. These 
clocks control all timing functions for the device [13]. Within 
these electronic clocks, crystal oscillators are used to determine 
the clock signal and the rate at which the clock ticks [14]. 
These crystal oscillators each operate at unique frequencies due 
to the crystal type, the manufacturing parameters, and the small 
imperfections that are inherent to all manufacturing procedures 
[14], [15]. Due to these factors, clocks within a device operate 
at slightly different frequencies independent of clock type or 
manufacturing series [14]. This makes the system clock within 
a device a unique characteristic that can be exploited to identify 
that device.  
The TCP header consists of a standard 20 bytes of 
information followed by a portion of data allocated to options 
within the protocol [16]. In the options section of the header of 
a TCP packet is a field for the TCP timestamp. The TCP 
timestamp is a one-up counter based off a device’s system 
clock that was introduced in RFC 1323 as a means of 
accurately measuring the round-trip time (RTT) between two 
devices. The need for accurately measuring the RTT of a 
packet is to provide a basis for determining the retransmission 
timeout interval (RTO) for lost or unacknowledged packets 
[17]. 
The TCP timestamp value is determined by a virtual 
“timestamp clock” that is based on the frequency of operation 
of the device’s system clock. By observing the values of TCP 
timestamps, one can observe the operation of the system clock 
[5]. The TCP timestamp is a second-order effect of the system 
clock and is the means in which the clock skew is calculated in 
this research. 
The clock skew of a device is the difference in the 
operating frequencies of its system clock relative to the clock 
frequency of another device [5]. It is this parameter that can be 
used to identify the device based solely through passively 
observing network traffic. When using clock skew as a unique 
identifier, the identifier is valid only in relation to a designated 
device. This device is known as the fingerprinter [5]. In a SDN, 
the controller can be designated as the fingerprinter due to its 
ability to monitor all devices connected to the network.  
III. MULTI-HOMED DEVICE DETECTION SCHEME 
USING CLOCK SKEW 
In order to detect a host on a network using multiple 
connections through multiple NICs, we must determine 
whether or not the traffic between different IP addresses can be 
correlated in order to determine if those IP addresses belong to 
a multi-homed host. Two assumptions are made in developing 
the proposed scheme. The first is that passive means of 
collection are used over the network. The second is that the 
observer can observe and collect traffic from all IP addresses of 
a multi-homed host.  
A. Proposed Scheme 
The proposed solution is to collect TCP timestamp data 
from a host in order to calculate its clock skew for use as a 
fingerprint. The clock skew of a host is unique and has very 
little variation over time. It has been demonstrated that the 
clock skew of a host stays relatively constant even if two 
interfaces (Ethernet and Wi-Fi) are used to connect to a 
network. For these reasons, the clock skew can be used as an 
identifier for a given host [5], [6], [18].  
The first step in the proposed process is to monitor and 
collect traffic across the network. The traffic of interest is the 
TCP segments exchanged between hosts, specifically those 
containing TCP timestamps. From this information, the clock 
skew of each host relative to a central host (the fingerprinter) 
can be calculated. After the clock skews of each host on the 
network are determined, analysis is conducted based on 
hypothesis testing using confidence intervals to identify 
potential multi-homed hosts. A testbed network with a 
fingerprinter is shown in Figure 2, and the process for detecting 
a multi-homed host is outlined in Figure 3. 
   
Fig. 2. Generic Network Configuration of a SDN with a Controller, Two 
Switches, and n Number of Hosts with One Acting as the Fingerprinter 
for Testing and Another Multi-Homed 
In previous work, this method was utilized for the 
determination of the number of hosts behind a NAT. It was 
suggested in [5] and shown in [7] that one could determine the 
number of hosts sending traffic through a NAT by calculating 
and comparing the unique clock skews encountered. In this 
paper, we propose the use of correlating clock skews between 
multiple IP addresses to determine if they are originating from 
the same, multi-homed device.  
B. Network Confifuration 
To test our proposed scheme, we collect and analyze traffic 
from hosts on a network. A version of the network layout is 
shown in Figure 4. Multiple hosts are connected to each switch 
with one host among them being multi-homed. The multi-
homed host uses separate Ethernet connections to connect to 
the network. A central host acts as the fingerprinter for 
determining the clock skews of all hosts on the network [5]. 
The fingerprinter is chosen so that it has the ability to observe 
traffic from both connections of the multi-homed host. 
 
Fig. 4. Configuration of a SDN with a Multi-Homed Host Connected to a 
Single Switch 
C. Clock Skew 
In order to test the proposed scheme, network traffic 
containing TCP segments with timestamps was collected. 
Using this data, the clock skew of each host can be calculated. 
The fingerprinter monitors the network from a centralized 
location for TCP segments in the network traffic. Not all of 
these TCP segments seen in the network traffic will contain 
timestamps. It is the segments with TCP timestamps 
originating from a host and sent to the fingerprinter that are of 
interest. These segments are aggregated, and the TCP 
timestamps are used in the calculation of the clock skew. These 
TCP timestamps are collected along with the time of collection 
based on the fingerprinter’s own clock.  
 






TCP timestamps were introduced as a means to provide a 
simple and accurate tool to measure the RTT of a packet 
transmission [17]. TCP is meant to be a reliable connection-
oriented protocol, and this reliable connection is achieved by 
the retransmission of lost or dropped packets. The duration of 
time before retransmissions are sent is known as the RTO and  
is calculated by knowing the RTT of a packet. TCP 
timestamps, included in the TCP options portion of the header 
and consists of 10 bytes of data, provide a simple and accurate 
means of determining this RTT by sending and echoing 
relative timing information within the TCP packet [17]. 
The value of the timestamp comes from a virtual internal 
clock that is known as the “timestamp clock” and is based upon 
the device’s own clock [17]. TCP timestamps are a second-
order effect of the host’s system clock, and through their 
collection and measurement, the operation of a host’s system 
clock can be observed [5]. 
The clock skew is a physical trait of a host’s processor 
caused by the different operating frequencies of crystal 
oscillators within electronic clocks. The discrepancy in 
operating frequencies is a product of the manufacturing process 
and results in small differences in clock speed of each clock 
[14], [18]. This difference in frequencies between the system 
clocks of separate devices is calculated as the first derivative of 
a function that includes the offset of their observed times [5], 
[6], [18]. 
Once the TCP timestamps have been collected, the clock 
skew can be calculated based on the procedure provided in [5]. 
The first step is to determine the time and TCP timestamp 
offsets of a collected packet versus the initial time of 
collection. The first packet collected by the fingerprinter from a 
host is used as the baseline for the offset. The time offset is 
given by [5] 
   1i ix t t     (1) 
where xi is the difference between the time of collection of the 
ith packet at time ti and the initial time of collection t1. The 
timestamp offset wi for the ith packet is given by  




    (2) 
where Ti is the timestamp of the ith packet, T1 is the timestamp 
of the first packet at the initial time of collection and f is the 
operating frequency of the host’s clock. 
Once the time and timestamp offsets are known, the 
difference yi between the observed time at the fingerprinter and 
the observed time from the source host based on its timestamps 
is calculated as 
   i i iy w x  .   (3) 
Given the set of points x and y for the data collected, the set 
of offset values OT for N collected packets is represented as  
  {( , ) : {1,..., N}}T i iO x y i   , (4) 
and we model the data as a slope-intercept line equation. 
The clock skew is the first derivative (or slope)  of this 
line  
     i ix y    (5) 
with a y-intercept of  that fits the upper bound of the set of 
points OT. The solution to (8) is obtained using a linear 
programming technique with the goal to minimize the 









    (6) 
for N packets [5]. This procedure is repeated for each host on 
the network. 
D. Dectection of Multi-Homed Hosts 
Once the clock skews have been calculated, a comparison 
must be made in order to determine which IP addresses 
represent the potential multi-homed host in the network. To 
improve accuracy, a large number of trials are required. Based 
on the central limit theorem, the sample mean of independent 
random variables approaches a Gaussian distribution [19]. 
Consequently, given a relatively large number of trials, we 
assume that the clock skews calculated for each host over these 
trials approaches a Gaussian distribution.  
After the mean clock skew is determined for a host, 
analysis is done using the confidence intervals for the clock 
skew of all hosts and hypothesis testing to determine whether 
the IP addresses belong to a multi-homed host.  
The sample mean mi of the clock skew for the ith host is 








     (7) 
where i is the calculated clock skew for the ith host [20]. Now 
we formulate the following hypotheses. The first hypothesis 
H0 states that mj for the jth host’s clock skew is within the 
range of the ith host’s confidence interval. The second 




Fig. 5. Process of Testing Hypotheses Using Confidence Intervals to Determine If Hosts Are Multi-HomeResults 
outside of this range. The lower bound of the confidence 
interval for a host i is represented by CL,i and the upper bound 
is represented by the value CU,i. If mj falls within the 
confidence interval 
  , ,L i j U iC m C     (8)  
when i j, then hypothesis H0 is accepted and the IP addresses 
are flagged as originating from the same host. If not, then 
hypothesis H1 is accepted and the IP addresses did not 
originate from the same host [19]. The process for this analysis 
is shown in Figure 5. 
IV. RESULTS 
A scheme for calculating clock skew based on TCP traffic was 
proposed in Section III. This scheme was validated using a 
SDN test bed for data collection. The configuration of the 
network used and the means for generating and capturing the 
test traffic is described in this section. We then calculate the 
clock skew of each host and apply the confidence interval 
analysis on the clock skew of each host to identify the multi-
homed host. 
A. Network Configuration and Traffic Collection 
A portion of the SDN test bed that was built for testing in 
[21] was used in this experiment and consisted of two HP 
switches and seven Raspberry Pis as hosts. The switches used 
were the HP 2920 and the HP 3800, and the Raspberry Pis 
were connected to the network using their built-in 10/100 
Mbps Ethernet connection. The network configuration that was 
used is shown in Figure 6.  
 
Fig. 6. Network Configuration Used in Testing 
One of the Raspberry Pis had an added USB 2.0 Gigabit 
LAN adapter that was used as its second connection to the 
network. This was the dual-homed device used in testing and 
the host that was to be experimentally identified. This host 
used the IP addresses 10.10.13.89 and 10.10.13.100. Both 
connections from this host were connected to the HP 2920 
switch.  
Also connected to the network was a Dell T1600 running 
Ubuntu that was acting as the DHCP server for the network. 
The DHCP server was used as the fingerprinter in this 
experiment and was chosen due to the fact that it maintained a 
static IP address of 10.10.13.1 throughout testing.  
In order to establish the necessary TCP connections for the 
purpose of creating TCP timestamps, traffic was generated by 
creating an Secure Shell (SSH) connection between the 
fingerprinter and the hosts on the network. This SSH 
connection allowed for the required TCP handshakes to be 
made and timestamps to be exchanged between the host and 
the fingerprinter for collection. Packets with TCP timestamps 
that were originating from a host were collected using 
Wireshark.  
B. Clock Skew Calculation and Results 
Given the test traffic collected by Wireshark, the next step 
was to calculate the clock skew of each host. One hundred 
samples of data were collected at ten minute intervals, and 
MATLAB was used for calculations. Using the MATLAB 
function linprog, we solved (6) from Section III for each host. 
The solution provided the values of  and , which are the 
slope and y-intercept of the solution to (5). The value of  
corresponds to the clock skew and is the value of concern in 
this scenario.  
The clock skew for each host was calculated independently 
for each trial and the upper-bound solution, which was used 
because the delays found within a network between hosts are 
all positive, for the set of points OT was solved for each host 
[5]. As shown in Figure 7, the solution for the set of data points 
in red corresponding to host 10.10.13.100 provides a slope of 
0.0000101203 or 10.1203 ppm for the line in blue representing 
the upper bound of the data set. This slope is the clock skew 




Fig. 7. Upper-Bound Solution for Host 10.10.13.100 over a Single Trial 
Comparing the slopes for the upper-bound solution of the 
data sets of all hosts over a single trial shows the variation of 
the clock skews found in this network. As seen in Figure 8, 
there is a range of positive and negative values for the clock 
skew corresponding to a host’s clock being ahead of or behind 
the clock of the fingerprinter. The hosts using the IP addresses 
of 10.10.13.89 and 10.10.13.100 both have solutions with 
similar slopes and stand out as possibly being multi-homed due 
to the fact that the solution to (5) for each host appears to be 
represented by two parallel lines. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Upper Bound Solution of All Hosts over a Single Trial 
The data in Figure 8 is supported by further trials. The 
mean value for each clock skew after 100 trials is depicted in 
Table 1. This data shows that the clock skews for 10.10.13.89 
and 10.10.13.100 are similar. When compared to the 
differences between clock skews of the other hosts tested, as 
shown in Table 2, the difference between 10.10.13.89 and 
10.10.13.100 appears to be negligible. 
TABLE I.  MEAN CLOCK SKEW OF ALL HOSTS OVER 100 TRIALS (IN PPM) 










For these comparisons and for the calculation of the 
confidence intervals, the data was assumed to approach a 
Gaussian distribution after the 100 trials. As shown in Figure 9, 
the range of clock skews collected for host 10.10.13.6 over 
these trials approaches a normal distribution.  
 
 
Fig. 9. Histogram for the Calculated Clock Skews of Host 10.10.13.6 Over 
100 Trials as they Approach a Gaussian Distribution 
A 95% confidence interval for the clock skew of each host 
was calculated over the 100 trials conducted. The confidence 
interval was solved using the paramci function within 
MATLAB. The results for the confidence intervals are shown 
in Figure 10. In Figure 10 the value of the clock skew for each 
host is shown as a bar graph in blue. The error bar in red covers 
the range of values from the lower to the upper bounds of the 
confidence interval. The confidence interval for each clock 
skew is quite small, which suggests that the clock skew varies 
only slightly over time; this result has been observed in 
previous work [5], [6]. 
 
 
TABLE II.  DIFFERENCE OF CLOCK SKEW BETWEEN ALL HOSTS (IN PPM) 
Host 10.10.13.6 10.10.13.32 10.10.13.33. 10.10.13.35 10.10.13.37 10.10.13.89 10.10.13.91 10.10.13.100 
10.10.13.6 0.000 19.078 23.531 24.439 10.426 6.994 4.106 6.986 
10.10.13.32 19.078 0.000 4.453 5.360 8.653 12.084 14.972 12.092 
10.10.13.33 23.531 4.453 0.000 0.908 13.105 16.537 19.425 16.545 
10.10.13.35 24.439 5.360 0.908 0.000 14.013 17.445 20.332 17.452 
10.10.13.37 10.426 8.653 13.105 14.013 0.000 3.432 6.320 3.440 
10.10.13.89 6.994 12.084 16.537 17.445 3.432 0.000 2.888 0.008 
10.10.13.91 4.106 14.972 19.425 20.332 6.320 2.888 0.000 2.880 
10.10.13.100 6.986 12.092 16.545 17.452 3.440 0.008 2.880 0.000 
 
 
Fig. 10. Confidence Interval of 95% for the Clock Skew of All Hosts over 100 
Trials  
C. Dectection of the Dual-Homed Host 
As described in Section III, analysis of the confidence 
intervals of the clock skew for each host was used to determine 
which hosts were possibly multi-homed. Using the confidence 
intervals as presented in Figure 10, we applied the ideas 
presented in Section III to the given data. When the mean clock 
skew of each host is compared to the confidence interval 
calculated for all other hosts, the possible dual-homed host can 
be identified. The upper and lower bounds for the confidence 
interval for the clock skews of all hosts are shown in Table 3 
along with the mean value of the clock skews calculated over 
100 trials. 
When the mean value of each calculated clock skew is 
compared to the confidence interval of the clock skew for each 
host, it is observed that the possible dual-homed hosts are 
10.10.13.89 and 10.10.13.100. The confidence intervals for 
hosts 10.10.13.6 and 10.10.13.89 are shown in Figure11 and 
Figure 12; the confidence intervals of the designated hosts are 
in blue while the values for clock skew for all hosts on the 
network in red. As can be seen in Figure 11, the confidence 
interval for host 10.10.13.6 only includes the value of its own 
clock skew. In Figure 12, the hosts represented by the IP 
addresses of 10.10.13.89 and 10.10.13.100 fall within 
confidence interval the confidence interval for 10.10.13.89, 
while the other hosts remain outside of these bounds. After 
comparing the data in Table 3 to Figure 11 and Figure 12, these 
results confirm the initial network setup where the hosts 
represented by the IP addresses 10.10.13.89 and 10.10.13.100 
were from the same host. 
 
Fig. 11. Confidence Interval of 10.10.13.6 Compared to the Mean Value of 
All Clock Skews Calculated 
 
Fig. 12. Confidence Interval of 10.10.13.89 Compared to the Mean Value of 
All Clock Skews Calculated 
 
 
TABLE III.  UPPER AND LOWER BOUNDS OF THE 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL OF EACH HOST’S CLOCK SKEW  
Host
10.10.13.6 10.10.13.32 10.10.13.33 10.10.13.35 10.10.13.37 10.10.13.89 10.10.13.91 10.10.13.100
Upper Bound CI 17.147 1.860 6.276 7.184 6.757 10.171 13.085 10.176
Mean Value 17.126 1.953 6.405 7.313 6.700 10.132 13.020 10.140
Lower Bound CI 17.104 2.045 6.534 7.441 6.643 10.093 12.955 10.104
D. Multi-Homed Host 
The final validation of the proposed scheme was to add a 
host with three interfaces to the network and attempt its 
detection. A Raspberry Pi was connected to the network using 
its standard built in Ethernet connection as well as with two 
USB to Ethernet adapters. These interfaces were assigned with 
the IP addresses of 10.10.13.89, 10.10.13.91, and 10.10.13.100. 
As in the previous sections, the clock skew for all hosts on the 
network were calculated, and the proposed scheme was used to 
correlate any possible multi-home connections. As seen in 
Figure 13, there are now three parallel lines for the solutions to 
(5), suggesting that these IP addresses are from the multi-
homed host.  
 
 
Fig. 13. Upper Bound Solution of All Hosts over a Single Trial after the Three 
Connections Were Made to the Network from One Host 
This is confirmed when their mean values are compared to 
each other’s confidence intervals as was done in previous 
sections.  
V. CONCLUSION 
A scheme to use the clock skew of a device as an identifier 
that is independent of the interface the device used to connect 
to the network was developed and tested in this work. Since the 
clock skew of a host stays relatively constant over time [5] and 
is independent of the interface used [6], it was proposed that 
this can be used to correlate traffic that appears to be coming 
from different source IP addresses as traffic from the same 
host.  
The concept of using clock skew as a unique identifier for a 
host has been suggested and tested in literature, but this idea 
has not been utilized in attempting to detect a host on a 
network using multiple interfaces. These concepts and methods 
were used to create a model to detect a multi-homed host from 
a designated fingerprinter. This information can then be used 
by the controller in a SDN to create new flow rules and isolate 
a possible multi-homed host for further investigation and to 
mitigate security risks. The ability for a designated host to act 
as a fingerprinter and determine the clock skews of each host 
on its subnet based on information from its own internal clock 
and TCP timestamp information was demonstrated in this 
research. Based on this information, it was shown using 
analyses of the confidence intervals of a device’s clock skew 
compared to the calculated mean clock skew of all other 
devices on the network that the traffic from IP addresses that 
originated from the same host can be correlated to one another. 
Finally, it was shown that it was possible to use this scheme to 
detect a device on the network using three distinct interfaces. 
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